Catherine MAIA
Le 16 octobre, le directeur général de l’OMC, Roberto Azevêdo, a indiqué au
Comité des négociations commerciales que, malgré des consultations intensives,
il n’avait pas été possible de “trouver une solution pour sortir de l’impasse”,
plus de deux mois après la date butoir concernant l’Accord sur la facilitation
des échanges. “Ce pourrait être la situation la plus grave que cette
Organisation ait jamais connue”, a-t-il déploré. Même si les membres devraient
continuer de s’efforcer de trouver une solution à l’impasse actuelle, “nous
devrions aussi réfléchir à nos prochaines étapes”, a-t-il ajouté.
L’Inde a bloqué le Protocole, car elle souhaite obtenir une solution
définitive au sujet des aides financières qu’elle verse à ses producteurs
agricoles, et que les pays occidentaux contestent car ils les assimilent à des
subventions déguisées.
L'Inde avait obtenu à
Bali le droit de continuer son programme d’aide jusqu'à fin 2017, le temps de
trouver une solution définitive à cette question dans l'enceinte de l'OMC.
Cependant, après Bali, l'Inde a demandé que cette solution soit trouvée à la
fin juillet 2014, ce qui n'a pas été le cas. Un nouveau délai a ensuite été proposé
par l’Inde pour fin décembre 2014.
Cet Accord, négocié
pendant presque 10 ans, était le premier accord commercial multilatéral
conclu depuis sa création la création de l’OMC. Censé réformer et
simplifier les règles du commerce international, il prévoit une
simplification des règles douanières, des règles de transit des marchandises,
et concerne aussi les redevances et formalités au moment de l'exportation ou de
l'importation. Selon Roberto Azevedo, les bénéfices tirés de la mise en oeuvre
de cet Accord devraient s'élever à près de 1000 milliards de dollars chaque
année.
Pour les Européens,
l'accord conclu en décembre 2013 à Bali par l'ensemble des États membres de
l'OMC, y compris l'Inde, ne peut être renégocié, car il en va de la crédibilité
même de l'organisation. Si l'OMC cédait sur les exigences de l'Inde, il est à
craindre que ce précédent n’ouvre la voie à ce que, dans le futur, d’autres
États membres se sentent autorisés à changer d'avis, après avoir donné leur
accord sur un texte adopté par consensus.
Les États-Unis, de leur
côté, ont décidé de bloquer la suite des travaux du comité chargé de négocier
cet accord, faute de progrès avec l'Inde. Le 30 septembre dernier, le Premier
ministre indien, Narendra Modi, a cependant indiqué au Président américain,
Barack Obama, espérer qu'un accord serait "bientôt" trouvé afin de
faire sortir de l'impasse cet Accord. "L'Inde soutient la facilitation des
échanges. Cependant, j'entends également que nous soyons capables de trouver
une solution qui prenne en compte nos inquiétudes en matière de sécurité
alimentaire", a déclaré Narendra Modi à l'issue d'une rencontre avec
Barack Obama.
Le prochain rendez-vous
sur ce dossier épineux sera le 21 octobre, à Genève, avec la réunion du Conseil
général, l'organe exécutif de l'OMC. Si l’organisation ne trouve pas un accord
à cette date, l'OMC pourrait entrer dans une période mettant en cause son
existence même.
Créée le 1er janvier
1995, il y a presque 20 ans, l'OMC a principalement deux missions : définir de
nouvelles règles du commerce international, et régler les conflits commerciaux
entre ses pays-membres, 159 actuellement.
Roberto AZEVÊDO, OMC, Comité des négociations commerciales : réunion formelle, 16 octobre 2014
Good morning everyone — and
welcome to the thirty-fifth formal meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee.
Our meeting today comes at a
very important moment. These are difficult days for our organization.
As you know, we reached a
major impasse in July, related to the interplay between two of the Bali
decisions — public stockholding on one hand, and the adoption of the protocol
of amendment on the Trade Facilitation Agreement on the other. While there is
no formal or legal linkage here — clearly an important political linkage has
been made bringing the two together.
We made every effort to
resolve the problem in July. But in the end our efforts came to naught. As a
result we missed the deadline for the adoption of the protocol of amendment on
the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which was the first deadline that Ministers
set us in Bali.
I said at the time that I
feared there would be serious consequences. I asked you to reflect over the
summer and talk to each other about potential ways forward. And I carried on my
own consultations as well.
To address the situation, I
convened an informal Heads of Delegations meeting on 15 September,
immediately after the summer break. That meeting marked the beginning of a
period of intense and comprehensive consultations to break the impasse and move
forward.
Since then, the Chairs of the
relevant negotiating and regular bodies have been working hard. They have been
taking stock of Members’ positions and discussing how we can move forward to
implement all of the Bali decisions, and develop a post-Bali work programme.
Meetings have been held in a
range of different formats and configurations. Members have been engaging with
each other — both here in Geneva, and in capitals. I have spoken to a wide
range of delegations and groups of delegations — as has the General Council
chair, Ambassador Fried. I have also met with Ministers wherever possible. We
have tried everything to resolve the problem.
We are now at the end of that
period of intensive consultations. I promised that, at this stage, I would give
you a clear assessment of the situation — based on your views and those of all
Members. So that is what I will try to do today.
Having listened to those
reports, and on the basis of my own consultations with Members, I will now
make my formal statement as TNC Chairman, to provide you with my sense of how
I see the current situation. I think it is my duty to give you my views —
and to be honest and straight-forward in doing so. I stress that this is only
my perspective — and that it is based primarily on what I hear from you.
As I see it the situation is
clear as day:
. First, we have not found a
solution for the impasse. The deadline on the Trade Facilitation Agreement
passed more than two months ago. We are on borrowed time.
. Second, as I feared, this
situation has had a major impact on several areas of our negotiations. It
appears to me that there is now a growing distrust which is having a paralysing
effect on our work across the board.
This is the situation. And I
am not in a position to tell you that a solution for our impasse is in the
making. Of course I encourage you to keep working and keep looking for a
solution. And I will keep trying as well.
However, I have promised to
give you my frank assessment, and it is my feeling that a continuation of the
current paralysis would serve only to degrade the institution — particularly
the negotiating function.
I think we have a
responsibility to the people who sent us here to be realistic about the
situation — and therefore to find ways to continue our work and to keep moving
forward, while still looking for a way out of the impasse. In my view, this is
our only option. We have to continue our work.
But, we all heard the reports
a moment ago. They were not encouraging. Work on substance seems unlikely to
advance. Therefore, I think our first step now should be to start a broader
discussion about the basis on which we can overcome the current scenario of
disengagement. I think we need to start a discussion about the future — a
future which honours the aims of the Marrakesh Agreement, which is worthy of
our role in international relations, trade and development, and which delivers
for the people we are here to serve — particularly the poorest. It is time to
face up to the undeniable problems we have in this organization and have an
open and honest discussion about how we can move forward.
There are a numbers of layers
to this discussion, each of which I think we must address. In order to better
frame our dialogue, I suggest that we take a look at all these different
layers. And in my opinion, the issues at stake fall into four concentric
circles.
The first circle
covers Trade Facilitation and Public Stockholding. Progress on the TF Agreement
is stalled as we wait for progress on the adoption of the protocol of
amendment. And public stockholding is stalled too, as the conversations have
ground to a halt. So, how should we respond? Do we simply put these two Bali
decisions on the shelf? Is there a way to move them forward?
On the Trade Facilitation
question, this also affects the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility, which
will become operational once the provisions of the TFA are being implemented.
Despite the current situation — or rather because of it — we need to work to
keep the Facility alive and keep donors interested in the initiative. Of course
donors have budgetary and time constraints — and so they need clarity about
what is happening. And despite the state of affairs here in Geneva, I see a lot
of support out there. On Friday I was in Washington to enhance the WTO’s
cooperation with the World Bank on this issue. President Jim Kim and I
announced a strengthened partnership, under which the WTO and World Bank would
work closely together to ensure that support is available for all who need it
under the terms of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
Meanwhile, on Public
Stockholding, it is my sense that there is a widespread positive disposition to
negotiate an outcome — or a “permanent solution” as it has been branded.
Nonetheless, there also seems to be an overarching reluctance to put other
issues on hold while that “permanent solution” is sought.
So this all begs the question:
is there any way for Members to move forward on these two issues
in the context of the current paralysis and distrust that we are now seeing?
That’s the first circle.
In the second circle
are the other 8 Bali decisions, including agriculture, the monitoring mechanism
and the package of measures for LDCs. Members must consider what is going to
happen with these issues.
The LDCs, for example, have
made clear that they are not preventing any other issues from progressing — so
of course they ask, why should they be punished and their issues be held back
as well? On the reverse side of this debate, others say that Bali was a
package, and that we cannot easily separate off certain elements to take
forward. This camp sees linkages among the Bali Decisions and is not ready to
ignore them.
Despite these conflicting
views, there is a clear appreciation from most of the logic that led to the
different timeframes agreed in Bali for each specific issue. And I think it’s
clear that what happens in this second circle is intertwined with what happens
in the first. Our ability to implement the other Bali decisions affects our
ability to move forward on Trade Facilitation and public stockholding — and
vice versa. This is the second circle.
The issue in the third circle
is the post-Bali work program. This task was mandated to us by Ministers with a
deadline of 31st December this year. But realistically we have until the
December meeting of the General Council. That gives us 8 weeks.
On the basis of the
conversations we were having before July I was aiming at a very detailed and
specific work program, which came very close to setting out modalities. As I
said at the TNC meeting in June: if we prepare the ground properly, “we will be
able to construct the clearly defined work program that we were tasked to deliver
by the Bali declaration.” And I thought that if we could achieve that it
would mean we were in a position to conclude negotiations on the DDA fairly
rapidly.
I am very sorry to say that,
in my view, such a detailed and precise modalities-like work program is now
very unlikely to be ready by the end of the year. Of course, what happens is up
to you. But I struggle to see how this can be achieved in the current
circumstances. We have lost too much time due to the current impasse. And we
have just heard from the Chairs’ reports that the engagement we need is simply
not there.
Let me be clear that in saying
this, I am not prejudging — this is very important so write it down! — I am not
prejudging what can be achieved on the work program when the time is right.
I am not commenting on the ambition, coverage and substance that it will
have. All of this will be determined by you. I am simply commenting on the
timing — and what I am saying is that in the 8 weeks we have until the December
General Council, it seems very unlikely that a detailed, precise,
modalities-like work program is possible. That’s
all I am saying.
Therefore we have to ask, how
are we going to deliver on the mandate we were given in Bali? If we are to
deliver by December, as instructed, what shape will this work program have?
That’s another conversation that Members need to have. And again, what happens
in this third circle affects the first and second — and vice-versa. So that’s
the third circle.
The issue in the fourth and
final circle, which encompasses all of the others, is what does this mean for
the organization itself?
Once again the negotiating
track is stuck. Of course this is not new to us — deadlock has unfortunately
become a familiar position. But that doesn’t make it any more acceptable. And
it is not often that we have been able to overcome situations like this. We did
so in Bali — and that gave us hope for a new WTO. Yet, now, we are here again.
The lack of ability to find full convergence quickly leads to deadlock, and
deadlock leads to paralysis. We have seen this situation too many times. So we
can’t continue in such an inefficient and ineffective way that is so prone to
paralysis.
Frankly, we know that Members
have been talking about the other, non-multilateral options that are open to
them. We may see these Members disengaging. We may see that these Members
pursue other avenues. We may see that these Members explore other tracks —
inside the WTO or outside.
So we have to think about the
consequences of the situation we’re in — and consider how this organization can
work. Again, this is something you have to talk about.
I will be here to facilitate
this conversation. I will hold meetings with you. The chairs will convene
meetings. And I urge you to talk to each other. As ever, we will need to engage
in different formats and different configurations — including open-ended
meetings.
This could be the most serious
situation that this organization has ever faced. I have warned of potentially
dangerous situations before, and urged Members to take the necessary steps to
avoid them. I am not warning you today about a potentially dangerous situation
— I am saying that we are in it right now.
So we have to move on. We
should keep working for a solution to the current impasse, but we should also
think about our next steps. I will be starting this discussion on what to do
straight after next Tuesday’s General Council meeting — and all of you will
have an opportunity to put your views forward on all of these issues.
As to the content of our discussion,
I suggest that we try to answer the questions that are before us. Specifically:
.What should we do with the
decisions on Trade Facilitation and public stockholding?
. What should we do with the
other Bali decisions, including the LDC package?
. How should we respond to the
Ministerial mandate to develop a work program on the post-Bali agenda?
. And how do we see the future
of the negotiating pillar of the WTO?
I hope these questions will
help to structure the conversation. I want to hear from you. Tell me what you
want to do, what your priorities are, where the linkages lie — both legal and
political. We often say that the WTO is a member-driven organization. It is
you, the Members, who must now take control and find a way forward. You are the
ones — the only ones — who can answer those questions. In short, I am extending
to you an invitation for reflection. I hope you will accept it.
Thank you for listening.
This
concludes my statement.
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